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Men’s Decision-Making About Predictive
BRCA1/2 Testing: The Role of Family
N. Hallowell,1,7 A. Ardern-Jones,2 R. Eeles,3 C. Foster,4
A. Lucassen,5 C. Moynihan,3 and M. Watson6
Men who have a family history of breast and/or ovarian cancer may be offered a predictive
genetic test to determine whether or not they carry the family specific BRCA1/2 mutation.
Male carriers may be at increased risk of breast and prostate cancers. Relatively little is known
about at-risk men’s decision-making about BRCA1/2 testing. This qualitative study explores
the influences on male patients’ genetic test decisions. Twenty-nine in-depth interviews were
undertaken with both carrier and noncarrier men and immediate family members (17 male
patients, 8 female partners, and 4 adult children). These explored family members’ expe-
riences of cancer and genetic testing, decision-making about testing, family support, com-
munication of test results within the family, risk perception and risk management. Implicit
influences on men’s testing decisions such as familial obligations are examined. The extent
to which other family members—partners and adult children—were involved in testing de-
cisions is also described. It is demonstrated that mothers of potential mutation carriers not
only perceive themselves as having a right to be involved in making this decision, but also
were perceived by their male partners as having a legitimate role to play in decision-making.
There was evidence that (adult) children were excluded from the decision-making, and some
expressed resentment about this. The implications of these findings for the practice of genetic
counseling are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Predictive Testing for Hereditary Breast Ovarian
Cancer (HBOC): Probability and Prevalence
Between 5% and 10% of cases of breast and ep-
ithelial ovarian cancer have a strong heritable compo-
nent; approximately 50% of these are caused by mu-
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tations in BRCA1/2 genes. The autosomal dominant
mode of genetic transmission of BRCA1/2 mutations
means that both male and female offspring of a mu-
tation carrier have a 50% risk of inheriting a cancer
susceptibility mutation. While men and women have
an equal chance of inheriting a mutation, the risks
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of developing cancer are much greater in women.
Female carriers’ lifetime risks of developing breast
cancer may be as high as 84% (Ford et al., 1995),
while their risks of ovarian cancer are estimated as be-
tween 27 (Whittemore et al., 1998) and 60% (Easton
et al., 1995). Male BRCA2 carriers have a breast can-
cer risk of 6% (Easton et al., 1997) and a lifetime risk of
prostate cancer of between 6 and 14% (BCLC, 1999).
In the United Kingdom predictive BRCA1/2 genetic
testing is available to high-risk men and women fol-
lowing the identification of a family-specific mutation
in affected relative.
Research indicates that the uptake of predictive
BRCA1/2 testing in women varies from center to cen-
ter (for example, 27% Goelen et al., 1999, versus 58%
Julian-Reynier et al., 2000). Rates of predictive test-
ing in men are similarly variable, but are generally
reported as being lower than in women (Bodd et al.,
2003; Goelen et al., 1999; Julian-Reynier et al., 2000).
Indeed, only 24% of participants in a recent nation-
wide study of predictive BRCA1/2 testing in the UK
were men (Foster et al., 2002). This gender difference
may reflect the lack of preventative measures avail-
able to men and the fact that the risks of developing
cancer are much lower in male carriers compared with
females. Alternatively, these differential rates of up-
take may be due to the media portrayal of HBOC
whose focus on “Breast and ovarian cancer genes”
reinforces a common misconception that HBOC is
primarily a “gendered” disease (Claes et al., 2003).
Factors Influencing Genetic Testing Decisions
A range of social, economic, and personal fac-
tors has been reported as influencing individuals’
decision-making about genetic testing. In the case of
BRCA1/2 testing—these include the desire to gener-
ate information for other family members (Hallowell
et al., 2003), the need to gain information to facilitate
decisions about prophylactic surgery or surveillance
(Foster et al., 2002), fears about life insurance, or job
discrimination (Armstrong et al., 2000; Van Riper and
McKinnon, 2004), anxiety about cancer risks (Brandt
et al., 2002), ethnicity, and/or the identification of a
mutation within the family (Armstrong et al., 2000).
This paper focuses on an alternative source of in-
fluence on testing decisions which has received much
less attention in the literature—other family mem-
bers. The study of familial influences on decision-
making can be seen as important for the following
reason. Genetic tests necessarily implicate biological
kin; consequently, other relatives may have an interest
in individuals undergoing testing, particularly if the
test result reveals information about their risk status.
Thus, individuals may choose to undergo testing even
when it is not in their best interests in an effort to
please their relatives. Furthermore, one of the ethical
principles underpinning genetic counseling services is
that the decision to undergo testing should be freely
taken by individuals (Nuffield Council of Bioethics,
1993). Thus as Haites (2003) notes, genetic counselors
have a duty to ensure that individuals are not being
pressurized into testing against their will. While, the
idea that genetic testing decisions remain free of any
form of external influence may be impossible to ob-
tain in practice, it has been argued that, at the very
least, genetic counselors should not only be aware of,
but also take steps to reduce familial influences on
testing decisions (Liede et al., 2000).
Familial Influences on Genetic Testing:
The Empirical Evidence
Previous research suggests that familial influ-
ences on genetic testing decisions may be both implicit
and explicit. Studies of women undergoing BRCA1/2
mutation testing suggest that many women undergo
genetic testing primarily to obtain information so
that their relatives can access predictive testing or
other health services (D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001;
Hallowell et al., 2003). Both D’Agincourt-Canning,
(2001) and Hallowell et al. (2003) have argued that
genetic testing empowers these women, because it
enables them to act, or present themselves as moral
agents. However, while these individuals may inten-
tionally forfeit their right to remain ignorant of their
mutation status, this does not mean their decisions are
free of external influence, because arguably, they are
responding to external, if implicit, pressures to con-
form to social expectations about mothering and its
related duties and obligations (Hallowell, 1999).
While familial obligations may implicitly shape
testing decisions, previous research suggests that in
some cases familial influences may be more explicit.
Research on men’s decision-making about genetic
testing, while limited, suggests that some men may
undergo genetic testing against their will as a result
of explicit pressure exerted by family members. A re-
cent study of cystic fibrosis carrier screening observed
that female relatives (wives, sisters, and mothers) as-
sumed the responsibility for organizing genetic testing
within the family, they encouraged their reluctant
Men’s Decision-Making About Predictive BRCA1/2 Testing 209
male relatives to undergo carrier testing and, in some
cases, phoned the clinic and arranged appointments
for them to attend (Fanos and Johnson, 1995). Like-
wise, Liede et al. (2000) recently reported that a small
proportion of the men in their study of predictive
BRCA1/2 testing described their reason for having
predictive testing as “family recommendation.” The
authors comment that this finding raises doubts about
the extent to which some testing decisions can be seen
as freely taken, and note that practitioners should take
these familial influences into account when counsel-
ing. Finally, Culler et al. (2002) report that over 80%
of their sample of men recruited in a prostate can-
cer clinic indicated that they would undergo a hypo-
thetical genetic test for prostate cancer if their spouse
recommended it.
Thus, previous research suggests that “family”—
both the actions of one’s relatives and one’s inter-
nalized obligations toward these relatives—may ex-
ert considerable pressure on genetic testing decisions.
These observations raise interesting research ques-
tions that were explored in the current study. First,
do men, like their female counterparts, perceive fa-
milial obligations as influencing their genetic-testing
decisions? Second, to what extent are other fam-
ily members involved in decision-making? Do fe-
male spouses/partners or children merely “recom-
mend” that their partners/fathers undergo testing,
or are they more actively involved in making the
decision?
Using data collected in interviews with men who
had undergone BRCA1/2 carrier testing, their part-
ners, and their adult children, this paper describes
men’s motivations for undergoing BRCA1/2 predic-
tive testing and demonstrates that family members see
themselves and others as having a legitimate role to
play in decision-making. It is argued that the data sug-
gest that decision-making about genetic testing should




Following receipt of ethical approval for the
study, male BRCA1/2 carriers and noncarriers from
two regional genetics centers in the UK were ap-
proached for participation. A letter from the clinician
responsible for their care was sent to eligible men who
had received a genetic test result. Other family mem-
bers were recruited using snowballing methods. The
male patient was given written information to pass on
to his partner (who might/might not be the biological
mother of their children) and eldest adult (>18 years)
child. This information briefly outlined the study and
invited family members who were interested in par-
ticipation to contact the research team for further in-
formation.
Initially, we intended to recruit only fathers of
adult children; however, as the study progressed we
felt it was important to include some families with
younger children or men who had no children at all,
with the view to exploring their motivations for test-
ing. In these cases, the children were not approached
with a view to participation.
A total of 29 participants consented to partic-
ipate. This included 17/28 men (5 carriers; 12 non-
carriers), 8/15 partners (3 partners of carriers; 5 of
noncarriers), and 4/8 adult children (daughters of non-
carriers) who were approached. The study included
9 families in which more than one individual was inter-
viewed: 5 couples, 3 family groups (father, his partner,
and child) and 1 father–daughter pair.
The Participants
All the participants were either of White
European or Ashkenazi Jewish descent. The men
were aged between 39 and 75 years (median 55 years),
their partners 45–60 years (median 51 years), and chil-
dren 19–37 years (median 25 years). Over 50% of the
men were in professional occupations; the remainder
was a mix of semiprofessional and semiskilled manual
workers.
Sixteen men (5 carriers, 11 noncarriers) had chil-
dren and of these, 13 had one or more daughters and
10 one or more sons. Fifteen men were currently liv-
ing with a long-term partner. In only one case was the
long-term partner not the biological mother of any
of the children in the family. Twelve men had adult
(18+ years) children at the time of the inter
view.
The men reported between 3 and 7 first- and
second-degree relatives affected with either breast,
ovarian, prostate, or colorectal cancer. None of the
interviewees had been diagnosed with cancer. The in-
terviews occurred between 8 and 74 months (mean
26 months) following the receipt of DNA test re-
sults. Eight men had received their results within
2 years before the interview and 9 over 2 years
ago.
210 Hallowell, Ardern-Jones, Eeles, Foster, Lucassen, Moynihan, and Watson
Data Collection and Analysis
Data were collected using in-depth interviews.
These were carried out either face–face (n = 13) or
by telephone (n = 16) (depending on the participants’
preferences). At the start of the interview participants
were asked to “. . .go back to the beginning and tell
me about how you first became aware of the family
history of cancer and that you (your father/partner)
could have genetic testing. What happened then and
what has happened to you and your family since.” In
most cases this generated a long narrative about the
family history of cancer, the participants’ views on and
involvement in genetic testing/decision-making and
how they learnt of the test results and their feelings
about risk. A set of prompts based upon the follow-
ing themes: experiences of cancer and genetic testing,
decision-making about testing, family support, com-
munication of test results, and risk perception and risk
management was used to follow up issues raised by the
participants.
With one exception (a partner who requested
that the interview was not taped) all the interviews
were audio tape-recorded with consent. In two inter-
views, the recorder failed, and notes were taken; in a
further case the tape failed before the interview was
completed. Verbatim transcriptions were obtained of
the taped interviews. A thematic analysis of the tran-
scripts and interview notes was undertaken using the
method of constant comparison (Strauss and Corbin,
1990). Following intensive reading and rereading of
the transcripts and notes a coding frame was devel-
oped to enable the identification of recurrent themes
in the participants’ accounts. The data was initially
read for accounts of decision-making and accounts
indexed using primary codes, for example, influences
on decisions, involvement in decisions. Secondary
codes emerged from this initial reading (for example,
responsibility, rights, duties, resentment, exclusion,
and inclusion) and the transcripts were reanalyzed
using this coding frame. Both within- and between-
group comparisons were drawn to determine whether
differences existed between carriers’ and noncarriers’
(and their partners’) accounts. No differences were
noted between the responses of members of noncar-
rier and carrier families within this sample. Any differ-
ences that existed between different types of family
members are described below.
The following sections focus upon why these men
came forward for testing and the extent to which other
members of their immediate family were involved in
decision-making. The frequencies with which some
responses occurred are noted in the presentation of
the results to provide an indication of their represen-
tativeness within this data set.
RESULTS
Prior Awareness of Family History
Before discussing the men’s motivations for un-
dergoing predictive testing it is important to look at
the context in which these decisions are taken, par-
ticularly the men’s knowledge of their family history
of cancer. In all cases, the men reported that the can-
cer in the family was common knowledge. In some
families it was referred to as a “voodoo” or “a curse”
on the family. As Alan, whose mother and aunts and
sister had all died at the age of 51, said,
And of course by this time we were thinking, it must
be voodoo! Someone’s put a curse on this family.
And it was quite terrifying, because my uncles all
died of heart attacks, and my aunts were all dying of
cancer. So there was something really odd with this
family . . . we were brought up with this terror of can-
cer. I’ve been living with it since I must have been
four, knowing people are dying of this terrible Big C.
(Noncarrier, 2 children)
Others described longstanding myths about the
cancers in their family, these included: ideas about
the ages at which cancer would occur, or which rela-
tives were most at risk; for example, Airan reported
that in his family it was commonly held that can-
cer would “skip generations.” While many men re-
ported a long-term awareness of their cancer family
history, and realized that they and other family mem-
bers were at-risk, all were unaware of the possibility
of genetic testing until other family members, usually
sisters, became involved with cancer genetic services.
Two men were aware of the scientific explanations of
HBOC prior to their involvement in predictive test-
ing, the rest were not. However, contrary to our expec-
tations, only three men in the present study reported
being surprised or shocked upon learning that the au-
tosomal dominant mode of genetic transmission of
BRCA1/2 mutations meant that they could have po-
tentially passed on a mutation to their offspring. As
Robert explained,
I can see parts of me in my grandchildren and I can
see a part of me in my children. And I do know in the
broad spectrum that we do pass on our genes to our
children for good or for evil, for whatever they are.
And so it didn’t cause me any concern of any worry or
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any problems whatsoever that men were capable of
passing on genes which would only affect women, or
women would pass them on which would affect only
men. (Noncarrier, 3 children)
[Jacob] I think that if the child’s made up of the
mother and father’s genes it’s obvious it’s going to
go across. I mean we carry all sorts of things that
our parents had don’t we. (Noncarrier, 1 child)
With three exceptions all the men said they had
immediately decided to seek predictive testing, once
they became aware of its availability.
Motivations for Undergoing Predictive Testing
Although a few men were curious about their
own risks, in all cases testing was reported as moti-
vated by a desire to obtain information for their kin.
All of the men in this study said they had undergone
testing because they felt they had an obligation to
their children determine their carrier status. As Mike
(Noncarrier, 2 children) commented: “The risk to me
wasn’t that big, that would affect my health and me
that much. I just wanted to know for the benefit of
others.” Likewise, Kevin said that he went for test-
ing despite worries about what the test might reveal
about his own health expectations because he had a
status:
[Kevin] I was concerned about the future of my sons,
because obviously if I carried the gene there was a
chance that they would. So obviously I needed, it
was a responsibility to them as well. (Noncarrier,
2 children)
All spoke of a moral imperative to care for
their children and acknowledged that this could be
achieved by generating information about their car-
rier status. These men saw the information revealed
by genetic testing as information their children ought
to have insofar as it would confirm their risk status.
The perceived benefits of testing were twofold. As
Jeremy said,
If I was able to identify that I had it, then there was a
possibility that the girls had it . . . And if I did have it
then, you know I could warn them to be careful. But
if I didn’t then, you know one less thing for them to
worry about. (Carrier, 2 children)
Thus, learning that one was a noncarrier could
alleviate worry about one’s children and more im-
portantly, remove the children’s anxiety about devel-
oping cancer. However, even if testing identified a
mutation and confirmed that their children were at
increased risk, these men reasoned that their daugh-
ters and granddaughters could use this knowledge to
obtain testing for themselves or surveillance and sup-
port. As Tom (Carrier, 4 children) said: “I thought
they ought to know, so that they themselves could
have tests to see if they were carriers.” Similarly,
Karl explained that he had undergone testing so that
in the event his result proved mutation positive his
daughter could obtain better surveillance or an early
diagnosis:
If I had never had the gene test then I wouldn’t know
if I had it or not. Then as she got older she could
have the gene. You don’t know. But if she’d got the
gene, then if she got anything wrong with her, they
might look at her sooner and that, keep an eye on
her. That’s the main reason I suppose I had it done.
(Carrier, 2 children)
Finally, two men talked about how genetic test
results could be used to facilitate reproductive deci-
sions. Both were of the opinion that at-risk individuals
had a duty to determine their carrier status prior to
childbearing and that confirmed carriers had a duty
not to reproduce, as Karl said:
If you’ve got it in the family, then I think you ought
to have a test really.
NH Why do you think you should have it?
Well obviously if you know you’ve got it you’ve got
it, then if you’re younger and you’ve got no children
at the time, then you can make up your mind if you
want to have children or not really. [Childlessness]
It’s the only way to stop it really ain’t it? Somebody’s
got to take that line somewhere. Somebody’s got to
say to somebody “well we’re not going to have no
children” if you’ve got the gene, if you’ve had the
test and you’ve got the gene . . . . So if everyone said
no I ain’t going to have any more children, see, you
would stop it, you would stop it dead then, stop the
gene going any further. (Carrier, 2 children)
Percy, the only childless man in the study, de-
scribed how he and his sister had decided not to have
children (before predictive testing was available) so
they could “stop this [cancers]” in their family. In
Percy’s view, his relatives had a similar duty to put
an end to the “suffering” his family had endured. He
talked at length about his own and his sister’s anger
at other family members who had refused to confirm
their carrier status:
We’re angry with the people who either haven’t been
for the test or found out the results of the tests.
Because it’s as if OK their kids that they’ve got now,
they could go through a lot of suffering needlessly
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or the kids they might have then go on to a lot of
needless suffering. And we’ve both seen enough of
that. (Noncarrier, 0 children)
Although the majority perceived the knowledge
generated by genetic testing as beneficial, insofar as
it could potentially alleviate worry or facilitate ac-
cess to health services, this was not true of all. Two
men described how in coming to a decision they had
reflected upon the psychological burden of knowing
that one was at a high risk of developing a potentially
fatal disease. In contrast to the majority of men in this
study, these men reported that the decision to undergo
testing constituted an ethical dilemma—it involved
them in weighing up the benefits and harms of genetic
knowledge. Thus, both described themselves as under-
going a long period of deliberation prior to testing:
[John] I was a little hesitant about whether it was a
good idea or a bad idea, because it seemed to me
you could sort of argue that if it turned out bad
[mutation positive] that would simply increase the
level of worry for my children. (Carrier, 3 children)
Likewise, Airan (Noncarrier, 2 children) referred
to genetic knowledge as “Two-edged” and reported
that he had asked himself “Did I want to know?.”
Decision-Making About Testing:
A Shared Responsibility
Although most of these men reported that the
decision to have testing had required little delibera-
tion, few took total responsibility for that decision.
Indeed, many talked about their partners, siblings,
and/or cousins’ involvement in the testing decision.
For example, Michel (Noncarrier, 3 children), who had
been advised by his male cousin of the availability of
predictive testing, said he and his wife had made a joint
decision to proceed “. . .we both decided I should do
it, definitely. She [wife] was very keen.” With two ex-
ceptions, all the men said that others, most frequently
their partners, had played a significant role in the test-
ing decision. Thus, Alan reported that while he and his
wife had not had a long discussion about whether he
should have the test, they were in total agreement that
he should proceed, and accepted joint responsibility
for the outcome:
There were slightly anxious discussions of, oh my
God, say we discover that it’s the wrong— I’ve got the
rogue gene. But then we thought, well at least well,
we’ll know and then we’ll have to deal with that. We’ll
cross that bridge when we come to it. (Noncarrier, 2
children).
Likewise, most of the partners interviewed con-
firmed that the decision to undergo testing had been
a joint decision. With two exceptions, all the partners
described how they had been involved in the testing
decision from the outset:
NH: How involved were you in his decision?
[Anna] I’d say I was very involved. But I think we
were lucky in that we were in agreement anyway.
I don’t know what would have happened if say I’d
wanted him to have the test and he hadn’t. I’m not
quite sure what way it would have gone. But as it
happened we were both in agreement that this was
something that if, when we got the results, it was
[mutation] positive that we would be able to do
positive things to help our daughters.
Indeed, all the partners indicated that they felt
they had a right to help make the decision because it
was their children (or their partner) who were directly
implicated by the test outcome. As Sarah, John’s wife,
said: “. . .things that concern the girls directly as one
of their parents . . . I thought it was legitimate for me
to have an opinion. And I didn’t want to be left out
of things.”
The right of partners to have a say in the testing
decision was acknowledged by most of the men in
this study. Indeed, in some cases partners appeared
to have the final say. As John said,
I was a little hesitant about whether it was a good idea
or a bad idea, because it seemed to me you could
argue that if it turned out bad, that would simply
increase the sort of level of worry for my children. I
discussed this a lot with my wife, who felt she’d really
like to get the test done. (Carrier, 3 children)
Decision-Making About Testing:
Agreement and Disagreement
At the time of the interview, all the men and
their partners were firmly in agreement that testing
was the way to proceed, and partners were not only
seen as wholeheartedly supporting, but also as legit-
imating the view that testing was the right thing to
do. Two families reported that there had been some
initial disagreement about testing as is illustrated by
Sarah and John’s case. His initial concern about caus-
ing their children anxiety was not regarded as a good
enough reason to not proceed by Sarah, who reported
actively coercing her husband to take the test us-
ing their children’s risk and access to screening as
leverage:
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[Sarah] My husband was very uncertain as to
whether he would even ask for this testing, and I,
over quite a long period of time, was urging it . . . .
I was saying it’s a good thing to know and you
can make more sensible choices the other side of
knowing. And he was saying but how good could
those sensible choices be and would it really make
any difference in the way you—in the way we
conducted our lives or differences in the kind of
screening the girls did, and would there really be
any consequences and what if?
Maureen, was the only partner to express any
reservations about her husband Airan’s decision to
undergo testing. She reported that her reticence had
derived from her anxiety about Airan’s health and
emotional well-being. She said that initially she was
of the opinion that it was better to maintain uncer-
tainty about the future rather than have risk con-
firmed: “[I]t’s one thing to know it happened to your
relatives, but it’s another to actually live with the gene,
and I was worried about how much it would unsettle
him.” Thus, for Maureen, genetic knowledge was seen
as potentially harmful, because it could upset the bal-
ance of family life and cause anxiety. Indeed, when
asked what she thought about her children’s’ risk she
replied that it was “Too unbearable to think about, I
know I just don’t want to think about it.” However,
Maureen, like her husband, had eventually come to
the conclusion that he should proceed with testing,
partly because she was reassured by the promise of
regular surveillance if Airan was identified as a car-
rier, but primarily because she recognized that he was
keen to establish their children’s risks:
What swayed me the other way was that it would give
him more direct access to having some tests, regular
tests, preventative tests, if there was a 50:50. That in
the end swayed me and particularly because Airan at
that time was quite clear that he wanted to know for
the sake of the girls.
Decision-Making About Testing:
The Role of Children
While partners appeared to play a major role
in decision-making about testing, (adult) children
did not. None of the parents reported consulting
their adult children about whether or not their fa-
ther should have a test. Thus, although three of the
daughters interviewed were aware their father was
going for testing, none said that they had been in-
volved in making this decision. While all the par-
ents interviewed regarded themselves as having a
duty to disclose information about the father’s in-
volvement in genetic testing to their children, all
said they had deliberately managed the timing and
content of communication about testing within the
family.
Thus, with the exception of a small group of par-
ents who felt that their children had a right to know
information that might affect them from the outset,
many had not informed their children that their fa-
ther was having the test or discussed the implica-
tions of a positive test result until after he had re-
ceived his test result. In justifying their decision to
keep testing a secret, or limit the disclosure of cer-
tain details until they had definitive information to
impart, these parents talked about the need to pro-
tect their children from anxiety-provoking inform-
ation:
NH: So you didn’t tell her until you’d actually gone
through the whole process?
[Barry] No, I thought, well if I get a negative re-
sult there’s no point in worrying her. (Carrier,
2 children)
Given the small sample size it is difficult to draw
conclusions about how parents’ failure to involve
adult children in genetic testing decisions affected
family relationships; however, it is important to note
that two of the four daughters interviewed expressed
a great deal of resentment that they had not been con-
sulted. This is primarily because they felt, in contrast
to their parents, that their father’s decision to have
testing actually curtailed their healthcare choices. As
Ruth, who had been aware her father was going for
testing, said,
If I really think about it, there was a little bit of anger
towards him for doing it . . . for going through it, and
feeling the need to go through it, and then poten-
tially putting us in the situation where we would have
to think . . . I’m sure they wouldn’t turn round and
say, right, OK, you girls, you’ve got to go for it now,
and my brother. But it would be hanging over us.
(Noncarrier father)
Rachel was upset she had not been informed
that her father had had testing until after the fact,
and like Ruth, she felt that her father’s decision
robbed her of the capacity to make a decision about
testing for herself. She said about her father’s negative
result:
[Rachel] “On one level I was really happy and on
another level I was really angry that he hadn’t told
me he was going for testing. In a sense I preferred
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him not to go to find out anything. . . I had to stop
myself saying “Why didn’t you tell me (shouting)
all these things, you were going for tests.” . . . I
thought I was in control of what I wanted to know
or not want to know about myself, in that I was
going to leave it for a while and not think about
it.” (Noncarrier father)
While both women acknowledged that their par-
ents would not have explicitly encouraged them to
seek genetic testing had their father been identified
as a carrier, they felt there would have been implicit
pressure from their parents for them to undergo pre-
dictive testing. Thus, they reasoned that by actually
having the test their father had effectively curtailed
their choices by undermining their right to not know
information about themselves.
DISCUSSION
In summary, all the men in this study described
their decision to have genetic testing as influenced
by their obligations to other family members, pri-
marily their children. All reported having undergone
testing with the intention of providing their children
(and grandchildren) with information that could al-
leviate their anxiety and/or enable them to make in-
formed decisions about their future healthcare. How-
ever, while for most the decision to have testing was
described as straightforward, this was not the case
for all. Genetic test results may indeed, allay anxi-
ety about risk, but they may also result in increased
anxiety, depending on the outcome. Thus for a mi-
nority, genetic testing presented them with a conflict
of duties—their duty to warn their children of their
risks versus their duty not to harm them by causing
emotional distress.
All the men and their partners acknowledged
that their children had a right to know their carrier
status and that they, in turn, had a duty to ensure
their children received this information; either by un-
dergoing testing or by helping their partners to reach
a decision. Adult children, on the other hand, were
not seen as having a role to play in decision-making,
or at least their parents did not perceive themselves
as having an obligation to consult them about this
matter. However, although parents’ decisions to ex-
clude their children from decision-making may have
been motivated by the best of intentions, their actions
were interpreted by some of the children as paternal-
istic. These children talked of their right to remain
in ignorance of their risk status and, therefore, re-
garded themselves as having a legitimate role to play
in testing decisions.
It can be argued that the data presented above
demonstrate that “family” impacts on predictive
testing decisions in different ways. There was ev-
idence that the men who took part in this study
not only acknowledged, but also accepted and em-
braced the existence of familial influences on their
decision to undergo BRCA1/2 testing. In the con-
cluding part of this paper we will explore the im-
plications of these findings for genetic counseling
practice.
Previous studies suggest that men who have a
family history of HBOC worry about their daugh-
ters’ risk status (McAllister et al., 1998) and undergo
BRCA1/2 testing to establish their risk status for the
sake of their children (Daly et al., 2003; Goelen et al.,
1999; Liede et al., 2000; Lodder et al., 2001). Similar
results were generated in the present study. There was
evidence that the men worried about their children’s
risks and had undergone testing specifically to pro-
vide information about/for their children. However,
while genetic testing may have been driven by benefi-
cent motivations it was also constructed as a parental
responsibility. All the men reported that they had an
obligation to determine their carrier status, in order
that they might increase their descendants’ healthcare
choices or allay their anxiety about their cancer risks.
Similar justifications for genetic testing decisions were
observed in our earlier study of women undergoing
BRCA1/2 mutation searching (Hallowell et al., 2003),
in which we argued, following O’Neill, (2002) that
the existence of such obligations undermines the view
that genetic testing decisions can, or indeed, should,
be based upon the purely individualistic or egocentric
conception of autonomy that underlies many mod-
els of medical decision-making (see Beauchamp and
Childress, 1994):
The familial nature of genetic information compro-
mises the possibility of making an autonomous deci-
sion about genetic testing on two counts. First, an
individual’s DNA-test results have direct implica-
tions for biologically related kin and second, the per-
sons who undergo testing have social obligations to-
wards these kin. For these reasons we would argue
that the decision to undergo testing cannot be en-
tirely egocentric, but may be influenced not only by
one’s awareness of others’ interests in obtaining ge-
netic information, but also by one’s own interests in
maintaining relationships with these interested par-
ties. (Hallowell et al., 2003)
In addition to implicit influences such as the
need to act, or present oneself as acting, as a
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responsible parent or a moral agent (D’Agincourt-
Canning, 2001), there was evidence that the men in
the present study were explicitly influenced by other
family members—the mothers of potential mutation
carriers. With two exceptions, the decision to undergo
genetic testing was reported as actively involving both
parents. Most men described their partner’s input,
agreement, endorsement, and support as not only wel-
come, but in most cases, explicitly sought. Interest-
ingly, this finding contrasts with those obtained in our
recent study of women undergoing mutation search-
ing (Hallowell et al., 2002). While the women in this
earlier study reported that their partners had sup-
ported their decision to undergo testing, most de-
scribed themselves as assuming total responsibility
for that decision. Thus, very few women reported ac-
tively seeking their partner’s advice; in most cases
the decision to undergo mutation testing had been
presented to male partners as a fait accompli rather
than as an issue requiring discussion. The difference
between the findings of the present study and this
earlier work may derive from the fact that the risks
of cancer are greatly elevated in female BRCA1/2
carriers compared with males, and some types of
risk management (for example, prophylactic mastec-
tomy/oophorectomy) that are available to women
while more efficacious, are physically and emotion-
ally more invasive. Thus, BRCA1/2 test results may
be perceived as having a greater personal relevance
for at-risk women than they do for at-risk men. Con-
sequently, if mothers are potential carriers rather than
fathers, the responsibility for decision-making may
be assumed by women or relinquished by their part-
ners because at-risk women are potentially faced with
higher risks of disease and making more difficult risk
management decisions (Hallowell, 1998).
While the data indicates that partners’ views were
very influential in the present study, there was no evi-
dence to suggest that these men perceived themselves
as pressurized or coerced by their partners into hav-
ing a genetic test against their will. Indeed, as far as
most of the men were concerned, because they and
their partner shared the responsibility for caring for
their children, their partner had a right to be included
in decision-making about testing. Likewise, partners
interpreted their duty to care for their children, as
meaning that their views should be taken into account.
In summary, the data suggests that the decision to un-
dergo BRCA1/2 predictive testing may be less an ex-
ercise of individual choice than a family affair.
At this point one can ask whether genetic test-
ing decisions should be seen as completely personal
and free choices? Clearly, we would not advocate that
at-risk individuals underwent genetic testing against
their will, but given that decisions are taken within a
familial context and given the familial nature of ge-
netic information, is it realistic to require that a deci-
sion to undergo genetic testing is free of familial in-
fluence, as Liede et al. (2000) would seem to suggest:
It is important for practitioners in familial cancer to
be aware of potential pressures—either for or against
testing—that may exist within families and help pro-
mote autonomous decisions. (Liede et al., 2000)
Statements such as this serve to reinforce the
widespread belief that testing decisions should, or can,
be expressions of individual choice, given the right
type of counseling and support (see also Haites, 2003).
However, the data collected in this study suggest that
the eradication of familial influences on genetic test-
ing decisions may be more difficult to achieve than
Liede et al. (2000) propose. First, because decisions
about genetic testing take place within a social con-
text of preexisting familial obligations, genetic testing
or the management of genetic risks has come to be
constructed as a relational responsibility—an expres-
sion of moral agency (Hallowell, 1999; Hallowell et al.,
2003)—or a social duty (Petersen and Bunton, 2002)
rather than an individual right. Thus, while DNA-
testing may indeed, further individual choices, insofar
as it reveals information about an individual’s genetic
risks, it also provides information that others can use
to inform their healthcare choices. From the point of
view of different family members the former motiva-
tion for testing may be deemed as much less important
than the latter. Furthermore, as the participants in this
study acknowledged, because one’s descendants are
necessarily implicated by genetic test results, other
family members feel they have a right to play a part
in genetic testing decisions.
Arguably, these observations suggest that we
need to adopt an alternative view of decision-making
about genetic testing; one that acknowledges that ge-
netic testing, like all other forms of human activity,
is situated within a social context. Human beings as
social beings, exist within a network of relationships
that is structured by duties and obligations. Thus, we
suggest that perhaps a more realistic goal for genetic
counselors should not be the elimination of familial
influences per se as Liede et al. (2000) advocate, but
to help counselees acknowledge the extent to which
their actions are born out of a sense of responsibility
or explicitly influenced by their relatives or indeed,
other factors.
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While, all the parents in this study appeared to
agree that testing was the right way to proceed, there
was evidence that the daughters interviewed were
more ambivalent about their father’s involvement in
testing. Even though the study only included a very
small number of adult children (and no sons), their
responses suggested that parents’ motivation to ob-
tain genetic information for their children may not al-
ways be appreciated or even desired by their offspring.
Clearly there is a need for genetic counselors to ad-
vise parents that their children may not want to know
their risk status and thus, may wish to be involved in
decisions that will ultimately affect themselves. More-
over, the reactions of two daughters in this study sug-
gest that parental subterfuge about genetic testing has
the potential to inflict damage on family relationships,
for example, by generating a lack of trust in general
(Juengst, 1999; Wexler, 1995). Arguably counselors
need to encourage fathers (and mothers) to be truth-
ful with and consult their children from the outset and
support them in this endeavor.
Limitations of the Present Study
and Future Directions
Finally, it is appropriate to discuss some of the
methodological limitations of this research. First,
the size of the sample. For ethical reasons we asked
the fathers to recruit their partners and adult chil-
dren to the study. The adoption of family snowballing
methods was favored for two reasons. First, it meant
that family members’ privacy was respected, for they
had to opt into the study. Second, at least in theory,
it meant that we would only recruit participants who
knew that their partner/father had undergone test-
ing and were aware of the presence of a mutation in
their family (See McAllister, 2004). However, in prac-
tice recruiting adult children to the study proved to be
problematic. While carrier men were prepared to con-
tact their partners, with one exception, a man whose
daughters had already undergone predictive testing,
none of the male carriers were prepared to approach
children with an at-risk status to participate in the
study. Indeed, of the 12 men interviewed with children
aged over 18 years, 5 did not want to approach their
children, citing anxiety about causing their children
worry about their carrier status as the reason. It must
be noted that two of these fathers were noncarriers,
who expressed the worry that talking about genetic
testing, even though it was no longer an issue for
their immediate family, may have made their children
anxious. While we respected these parents’ wishes,
it limits the conclusions that can be drawn from this
study, for it is possible that those children who did
take part may have a particularly idiosyncratic view of
their father’s involvement in genetic testing. Clearly,
there is a need for more research that looks at the
views and information needs of the adult children
(both daughters and sons) of mutation carriers and
noncarriers.
Second, it must be noted that, with one or two
exceptions, there was a striking lack of disagreement
about genetic testing reported by the men and women
in this study, which may reflect the fact that it only in-
cluded families in which testing had taken place. How-
ever, we also need to acknowledge that the partici-
pants may have been motivated by a desire to present
themselves in a positive light. Bearing this in mind,
it is perhaps not surprising to observe that the par-
ents in this study failed to portray themselves as hav-
ing fundamental objections and disagreements about
testing, given that genetic testing, in general, is such
a morally charged issue. These observations suggest
that there is a need for prospective studies that focus
upon family members’ involvement in genetic test-
ing decisions and, perhaps more importantly, more
research on families where genetic testing has been
refused.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, this study of decision-making
about genetic testing in families in which the father
had undergone BRCA1/2 predictive testing suggests
we need to adopt a different, or less individualis-
tic, conception of decision-making about genetic test-
ing. The data presented above indicate that “family”
plays an important role in testing decisions, a role
that cannot be overlooked and may not be eradi-
cated by genetic counseling (Juengst, 1999). Maybe
it is time that we accepted that when it comes to ge-
netic testing the “patient”/“counselee” really is the
family. Those who provide genetic services should
not only be aware of implicit and explicit family
influences on decision-making, but also embrace
them.
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